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The research on relationship between family enterprises and research & 
development inputs is a controversial field of research. Based on the research literatures 
regarding family enterprises and research & development inputs and in combination 
with the current situation of family enterprises in China, this paper, starting from that a 
family member takes up the post of family enterprise’s CEO, analyzes the tendency of 
family enterprise’s CEO research & development inputs from the perspectives of family 
involvement and altruism.  
On the basis of sorting up of existing related literatures, this paper analyzes and 
summarizes out the direction of research on family enterprise research & development 
inputs currently, the influence of family involvement on research & development inputs, 
influence of agency problem in the family enterprises on research & development inputs, 
as well as the non-economic factors affecting the decisions related to family enterprise 
research & development inputs from the perspective of social emotion-fortune 
relationship. By summarizing the previous research results, we can discover that the 
internal comparison and analysis of families is less researched in current literatures. 
The family members have conflicts and concessions of interest objectives, and these 
factors will further affect the family manager’s decisions. Therefore, this paper holds 
that it is necessary to analyze the behavioral effects of different decision makers inside 
a family. 
This paper analyzes the following problems. Firstly, analyze the differences in 
tendency of research & development inputs when different family members take up the 
post of CEO; second, divide the family enterprises into high involvement group and 
low involvement group, and compare the influence on research & development inputs 
when actual controller takes up the post of CEO under different family involvement 
degrees; and finally, analyze the influence of altruistic behavior on research & 
development inputs when actual controller takes up the post of CEO from the 

















industry (SMEs board and GEM), and through empirical test, it is discovered that: (1) 
when actual controller serves as CEO, i.e. the family owner servers as CEO, there is a 
positive influence on the research & development inputs; when other family members 
take up the post of CEO, there will be a negative influence on the research & 
development inputs; (2) In the high involvement group, there is a more significant 
positive effect on the research & development inputs when actual controller takes up 
the post of CEO; (3) Both the overall level and disparity structure of altruism have a 
negative regulating effect on the positive tendency of research & development inputs 
when actual controller takes up the post of CEO. 
The innovation points hereof mainly include: first, enrich the intra-family agency 
theory and social emotion-wealth theory, pay attention to the influence of different types 
of family managers on research & development inputs, and divide the family CEO 
serving conditions into two groups, namely, actual controller serves as CEO and other 
family members serve as CEO; second, introduce altruism into research & development 
inputs of family enterprises, and consider the influence of altruism on research & 
development decisions made by actual controller as CEO. 
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